Catholic women's religious communities who have sought and have held public office. Several of these women 1 were asked by the Vatican to resign from office (or to withdraw from the electoral process) because of a perceived conflict between their holding of political office and their membership in a religious community. To many observers the Vatican directives appeared consistent with earlier moves against priests in political office; 2 moreover, they seemed to be in accord with the opinions of John Paul II, who from the earliest days of his pontificate had strongly urged priests (and at times members of religious communities) to abstain from partisan political activity. To a group of priests at Rome, to priests at Puebla, and then in a separate address to women in religious congregations, at Puebla, John Paul had stated:
The prohibitions against the participation of religious and clergy in politics, and John Paul's statements about religious and clerical life and politics, are obviously interrelated. However, while it is important to note the connection among these topics, it is equally important that similarities not obscure the different issues at stake. For clergy and religious vary in their roles in the Church and in society; one cannot assume that the same strictures against political activity should apply to both of them. In this article I will focus on the role in politics of Roman Catholic women who are members of religious communities (henceforth WRC), 4 seeking to distinguish it from the clerical task. Specifically, I will argue that the question of WRC needs to be considered in light of three topics: first, general statements about women in the Catholic tradition; second, Catholic social teaching about the public and private spheres of human life; and third, contemporary discussions (political, philosophical, and theological) about the relationship between the public and private spheres of human life. For my treatment of the Catholic tradition, I will limit my remarks to magisterial (papal, conciliar, and synodal) documents from Leo XIII to the present. An analysis of magisterial documents on these subjects will show, I think, that some of the arguments used for restricting WRC from access to political office (or from, to use an expression that has become popular in these religious communities, "political ministry") rest on questionable premises about the nature of women and about the public and private dimensions of human life. Furthermore, such analysis will identify-although in broad strokes-some of the inconsistencies in argument about political and personal life which trouble magisterial Roman Catholic accounts of social ethics.
CLERGY AND RELIGIOUS: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
Already there are in the literature about WRC and politics a number of articles which allude to the differences between clergy and members of religious communities. These include canonical, ecclesiological, and theological, in addition to what I refer to as procedural, arguments. For example, in "Priests and Religious in Political Office in the U.S.: A Canonical Perspective," James Provost 5 surveys the canonical differences between clergy and religious, and their implications for political activity. Provost traces the history of the prohibition against political activity by clerics and religious, and then compares and contrasts the treatment that this subject receives in the 1917 and 1983 Codes of Canon Law. He summarizes the history of this proscription, prior to the 1917 code, in these terms: "1. Clerics were, in general, forbidden to hold political office; they were to devote themselves full-time to religious concerns. 2. The same was true of religious, and on an even stronger basis because of their religious commitment to concerns beyond this world" 6 Both Codes contain this interdiction. Provost reports that, in the 1917 Code, by canon 592 "religious, whether clergy or not, were bound by the same prohibitions" 7 as clergy, while in the 1983 Code it is canon 672 which performs this function.
Canonically, religious institutes are characterized by "public vows," "life in common," and "separation from the world." Apostolates (or ministries) of religious communities may be adjusted to the times, "yet even individual apostolates are to be carried on in the name and by the mandate of the Church." Provost argues that this "would appear to be an added restriction on religious becoming involved in political activities or holding public political office." 8 Provost also contends, however, that historically there were always exceptions to the general prohibition; canon law "is more flexible than a surface reading of the canons themselves might indicate."
9 Such exceptions could allow individual members of religious communities to seek political office as part of their individual apostolates. But he acknowledges as well that, because of the difference between permission and dispensation, the new Code of Canon Law is stricter about this subject than the 1917 Code.
Pertinent ecclesiological as well as theological examinations of the differences between clergy and religious have been provided by Joseph Komonchak and Francine Cardman. 10 Komonchak discusses the theological implications of the clergy/laity distinction in light of the documents of the Second Vatican Council. He points to a twofold (canonical and hierarchical) difference between clergy and laity, but acknowledges that this "neat twofold distinction is disturbed by the presence of religious who may be either clergy or laity in the canonical sense."
"obscurities" and "difficulties" 12 in the church-world and clergy-laity discussions of the Council; Komonchak argues that "if the autonomy of the world ... must be called into question, then so must the allocations of typical responsibilities to clergy, religious, and laity What is really needed is a return to the original opposition which did not counterpose clergy and laity, but the whole Church, clergy, religious, and laity to the world." 13 In response to questions about political ministry, Komonchak accepts that there are different roles and gifts within the Church, but argues that "these differences will not be based on some mythical prepolitical religious meaning." 14 Cardman is troubled that, once Agnes Mary Mansour moves from religious to lay life, she is no longer a problem to the Church. Cardman asks: "Is there a difference in the public and ecclesial character of Christians' lives, according to their status in the church?" 15 Cardman depicts the position of WRC in the Church as ambiguous; they are frequently "subsumed under the clerical portion" but technically remain lay persons:
Where religious fall in this apportionment of reality is not entirely clear. As laity, it is to be expected that their lot would logically be with the secular; but because of the assimilation of religious to so many of the conditions of the clerical state, they tend to be regarded as belonging to the realm of the sacred. For all practical purposes, canon law pertaining to religious (in the new code of 1983 as well as in the 1917 code) treats them more or less as clerics. The net result of this ambiguity is that religious are subject to most of the disadvantages of both states, while sharing few of the privileges of either.
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Cardman, like Komonchak, notes that misunderstandings of the churchworld, sacred-secular relationships contribute to this confusion, and calls for careful re-examination of these important themes.
What I refer to as procedural questions (although they are more than that) have been raised by those who argue that decisions about women's religious communities should not be made by groups composed of men only, but should be made by women themselves. I will explore one aspect of this type of argument later in this essay, in relationship to the discussion of assessments of women's nature.
In contemporary canonical, theological, ecclesiological, and procedural discussions, then, there are those who suggest that the roles of religious and priests (as well as of laity) in politics warrant reconsideration. SuchElsewhere I have maintained that there are three major arguments against priestly participation in politics in these magisterial documents.
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These involve issues of mission, competence, and unity. That is, the Church has a supernatural mission to witness to the spiritual and to save souls; the Church's competence in politics is limited to the range of its capacity to interpret the natural law; the unity of the Church is threatened by political divisiveness. The priest, as representative of the Church, must act in ways consistent with church mission, competence, and unity; this precludes his participation in the arena of partisan politics. My conclusion is that changing understandings of the spiritual and temporal call into question some of these traditional arguments against priestly participation in politics. While these three issues may well undermine prohibitions against WRC in politics, my contention in this essay is that there are additional reasons to question this proscription.
There is some overlap between the arguments against priestly and against religious involvement in politics, although it is difficult for two reasons to distil from the tradition an application of these three arguments to WRC. First, many of the documents describe religious life for men as well as for women (when the underlying concerns are often, as we shall see, very different). Second, in contrast to the prominence of priests, reflection on WRC is a lesser theme in the magisterial tradition. It is usually the first claim-that women in religious life witness to the eternal-that undergirds interdictions of office-holding. Religious do contribute to church unity, but this function is not usually linked to the political question. And while religious are praised for their work in education, theirs is not the official teaching role of the priest.
An explanation for the limited treatment of WRC in papal documents is provided by Margaret Farley and the late Emily George in a paper entitled "Canonical Regulation of Women's Religious Communities: Its Past and Its Future." 24 They point to significant differences between the history of women's religious communities and that of men's. Attempts to impose cloister on all women's communities-at the same time that male communities were moving toward more active apostolates in the world-left WRC in a position, both in the Church and in the world, disparate from that of their male counterparts. Farley and George argue that historically the status of WRC in the Church has been influenced by attitudes toward women in the surrounding environment; the movement to cloister women was paralleled by the "general tendency to 23 John Paul II commends this witness given by religious; their consecration is an act of total love for God, which is a valuable testimony to society. Religious life is characterized by "total consecration to God, prayer, witness to the future life, and pursuit of holiness." 37 Religious garb is part of this public witness; this is one of the reasons that John Paul vigorously praises it.
A later section of this essay will examine the pontiffs' utterances about the nature of women. But one aspect of these arguments is noteworthy here. John Paul asserts that WRC bring special qualities as women to their vocation. He instructs them: "You have the capacity to make the Church present with a really maternal face, with sensibility and affection, with wisdom and balance."
38 This maternal countenance of women equips them in a special way for religious life in the Church: "This apostolate is usually discreet, hidden, near to the human being, and so is more suited to a woman's soul, sensitive to her neighbor, and hence called to the task of a sister and mother. ... 'Be spiritually mothers and sisters for all the people of this church.' " 39 Throughout this magisterial tradition popes and bishops advocate a proper balance between the spiritual and temporal dimensions of human life. What constitutes proper balance becomes clear in the frequency with which both priests and religious are warned against immersion in the world. It is this concern which undergirds prohibitions against participation in "worldly" politics. In this tradition, then, spiritual commitments can set limits to temporal, including political, activity.
In many of his writings Pius XII warns against the "heresy of action." In his addresses to WRC, Pius compliments the good works they accomplish. He acclaims them for works of mercy; for contributions to education and nursing; for care for the sick, the elderly, the poor, and the needy; for aid to children (especially girls); for teaching catechetics; for relief from suffering; and for their achievements in the missions. social contributions but by its consecration to God. In an address to superiors of religious orders, Paul urges WRC not to be ensnared by the "ephemeral" and the "changeable." "Like the priest and the male religious-but with a different perspective from theirs-the woman religious is faced with a terrible dilemma: either to be a saint, totally and without compromise, and attain the greatest measure of sanctity possible; or to be reduced to a joke, a caricature, an unsuccessful and, let us say, abortive being. The dangers of secularization are evident. .. ." 40 Paul recalls the proper balance between this world and the next when he states: ".. .it is a mistake to want to laicize religious life itself; the mistake is not in bringing women religious closer to individuals or to human problems, which is obviously desirable, but of allowing the easy-going ways of the world to creep into their lives."
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A recurring theme of John Paul II is that religious must be concerned primarily with who they are and only secondarily with what they do: "the value of their activity is great, but the value of their being religious is greater still."
42 Therefore the "vertical dimension" (being united with God in prayer) is more important than worldly activity. John Paul interprets the new Code of Canon Law to state that the "first and principal duty of all religious is the contemplation of things divine and constant union with God in prayer. ... The code insists that the apostolate of all religious consists primarily in the witness of their consecrated life." 43 It is as part of this general concern about priorities that the prohibition against political office arises. It is within this context that John Paul proclaims the proscriptions of political involvement, at times to priests, at times to WRC. To one group of WRC he states: "Do not be deceived by party ideologies. Do not succumb to the temptations presented by options which might one day demand the price of your liberty. Trust in your pastors and be always in communion with them." 44 There are a number of documents on religious life (of which several are published by the Vatican Congregation for Religious and for Secular Institutes), promulgated during the pontificates of Paul VI and John Paul II, which summarize the goals and purposes of religious life and illustrate the themes of public witness and of the priority of being over doing. These include Evangelica testificatio, Mutuae refationes, Religious Life and Human Promotion, Redemptionis donum, and Norms for Religious Life. Of these, Religious Life and Human Promotion provides a concise resume of the argument against the participation of WRC in politics. It states that, while religious can participate in politics in the broad sense, they cannot enlist in partisan political activity. For the contribution that religious make to politics is their witness to the absolute, as well as their work in education and formation. Such nonpartisan activity demonstrates that they are "peacemakers and promoters of fraternal solidarity." That type of work will be beneficial to women: "... religious women are encouraged to persevere in their undertakings for the advancement of women, thus leading to the acceptance of women in those areas of public life, in addition to Church life, which best correspond to their nature and talents."* 0 In Religious Promotion and Human Development exceptions to this rule are permitted in specific cases, "when extraordinary circumstances call for it."
An examination of some major documents in the magisterial tradition from Leo XIII (or at least from 1900) to John Paul II elucidates the current prohibition against WRC holding political office. That is, concerns for public witness and for the vertical dimension of religious life outlaw such activity in all but exceptional cases. However, in studying this history, one should be alert to Farley's and George's assertion that the history of WRC in the Church has been influenced by attitudes toward women in society. Farley and George conclude:
Presuppositions, then, regarding the inferiority of women, their need for control, their susceptibility to evil human tendencies on the one hand and superficiality on the other, their need to transcend their sexuality and the things of this world, importantly shaped the institutional relationship between the church and women's religious communities. However culturally determined such presuppositions were, they remain troubling reminders of the limits and risks of this relationship. They also suggest, of course, that radical shifts in these presuppositions could entail a profound change in the nature of the relationship. 46 An additional way to gain perspective on the role of WRC in the Church, then, is through a more detailed examination of the role of women in church and society. As part of this task, let us turn now to examine the tradition of the hierarchical magisterium's attitude toward women, specifically toward women in public life.
Women and Public Life
When one investigates the magisterial tradition-especially the early part of it-for insights about women, one notices, as Christine Gudorf argues, that ".. .the largest portion of the papal teaching on woman is not incorporated in the major social teaching documents; most of it is not even found in the Acta Apostolicae Sedis. The great bulk of papal teaching on women is in the form of addresses to groups of women (especially Italian women) visiting the Vatican. There are no similar addresses to men on the nature of men, of fatherhood, and of masculinity." 47 In the official magisterial assessment of women, there are three lines of argument that are important for our purposes. The first of these is that women possess a nature different from that of men; the second is that women's nature links them in a special way to the family; the third is that women's role in public life is affected by the special familial, or maternal, role natural to them.
Statements about women precede Conditae a Christo, for Leo XIII wrote about the family early in his pontificate. In 1880, in Arcanum, his encyclical on marriage, Leo uses the "head" imagery to convey the husband's ruling role in the family, and states that the woman "must be subject to her husband and obey him." 48 Women are different from men; their nature suits them to a type of work (primarily in the family) dissimilar to that of men. In his famous encyclical Rerum novarum, Leo asserts that "work which is quite suitable for a strong man cannot be rightly required from a woman or a child. ... Women, again, are not suited for certain occupations; a woman is by nature fitted for homework, and it is that which is best adapted at once to preserve her modesty and to promote the good bringing-up of children and the well-being of the family."
49 Such a distinction between men's and women's natures is suggested as well by the famous head/heart distinction of Pius XI in Casti connubii. Pius argues that man is the head of the family, while woman is the heart; this means that the man has the "chief place in ruling" while the woman has the "chief place in love."
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One of the results of these descriptions of women's nature is a pontifical wariness about encouraging women to be too active in public affairs. Pius XI supports some civil rights for women (as long as they are in accord with women's nature), but he alerts Christians to the danger of letting women devote themselves to public affairs. For they are "false teachers" who suggest that a woman should abandon her work with the family and "be able to follow her own bent and devote herself to business and even public affairs." Such activity could lead to "debasement"; "false liberty 47 and unnatural equality with the husband is to the detriment of the woman herself," and leads even to "slavery." 51 One of the aspects of communism that Pius XI derides in Divini redemptoris is that therein woman "is withdrawn from the family and the care of her children, to be thrust instead into public life and collective production under the same conditions as man." But women's public role in society is in transition, according to Pius XII, although he at times greets this news with regret. But eventually he concedes that in a changed society women must move into public life; they must play a public role as women. That means, e.g., that they must bring their feminine personality traits and their feminine concerns about the family to public work. Pius XII exhorts women to join the public sphere so that they can protect the family against all those who, in the midst of an era of social instability, would destroy it.
Pius argues, then, that no field should remain closed to women, including politics, but that woman's work must always be undertaken in accord with her nature. When women and men collaborate in public life for the good of the state, therefore, Pius argues that they make different contributions: "But it is clear that if man is by temperament more drawn to deal with external things and public affairs, woman has, generally speaking, more perspicacity and a finer touch in knowing and solving delicate problems of domestic and family life which is the foundation of all social life." vocation of all women. In fact, most women will remain at home with the family. Pius gives preference for public careers to women who are neither "held down by cares of family or education of children, or subject to the holy yoke of rule." That is, it is providential that, after the destruction of the Second World War, women "whom events destined to a solitude which was not in their thoughts or desires, and which seemed to condemn them to a selfishly futile and aimless life" 55 can now be of service to other women by entering civil and political life.
After the pontificate of Pius XII, new roles for women in society are noted and endorsed in some of the major magisterial documents. We do not have in mind that false equality which would deny the distinctions laid down by the Creator himself and which would be in contradiction with woman's proper role, which is of such capital importance, at the heart of the family as well as within society. Developments in legislation should on the contrary be directed to protecting her proper vocation and at the same time recognizing her independence as a person, and her equal rights to participate in cultural, economic, social, and political life.
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In his Apostolic Exhortation on the Family John Paul decries the lack of access by women to public life, for their "equal dignity" justifies their access to public functions. 62 But invariably he urges respect for the maternal and familial roles of women. In Laborem exercens, he suggests that work and family need to be harmonized. While women possess the same right as men to be in the public realm, they should not be forced to work outside the home. He exhorts Christians to overcome a mentality which values work outside of the home more than work in the home. It "will redound to the credit of society to make it possible for a mother... to devote herself to taking care of her children and educating them in accordance with their needs." 63 In the 20th century, then, the magisterial tradition yields to the idea of a public role for women. But that public role is always required to be consistent with woman's nature, different from man's nature, identified by the pontiffs. Some insight into the range öfthat public role for women and for men, as well as into the weaknesses of that formulation, can be gained from a brief exposition of what the pontiffs mean by public life.
Public-Private
At the same time that the pontiffs prohibit WRC from certain political activities and urge other women into public life consistent with their feminine natures, they propose a complex social theory which addresses the interrelationship of the public and private spheres of human life. That theory, when viewed apart from the subject of women, affirms themes of consistency between private and public spheres which seem to contradict the statements about women. I cannot provide here a detailed examination of the magisterial tradition's treatment of the public and private realms of human life (including the family). What I will do instead is to adumbrate that theory by identifying a limited number of texts which represent the major arguments of the tradition about the public and the private. Such a use of quotations cannot replace a full analysis of the tradition, and it runs the risk of "proof-texting." However, the four citations I have chosen are central to the tradition; they have received extensive commentary, with full context provided, elsewhere. Some remembrance of their claims, even in this brief overview, can illuminate our examination of the roles of women in public and private life.
First, in Pacem in terris John XXIII discusses the morality of the public and private spheres, and proclaims:
The same moral law which governs relations between individual human beings serves also to regulate the relations of political communities with one another. This will be readily understood when one reflects that the individual representatives of political communities cannot put aside their personal dignity while they are acting in the name and interest of their countries; and that they cannot therefore violate the very law of their being, which is the moral law.
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John's is a natural-law argument, which recognizes a consistency between the private and the public realms. For John XXIII (and for the tradition he represents) there are not two moralities (or one realm of immorality and another of morality). Both public and private are created by God and are ordered by God to a common end; both are therefore subject to the same moral standards.
In Gremillion, The Gospel 218-19, nos. 80-81.
Second, in Octogésima adveniens, Paul VI declares: "While scientific and technological progress continues to overturn man's surroundings, his patterns of knowledge, work, consumption, and relationships, two aspirations persistently make themselves felt in these new contexts, and they grow stronger to the extent that he becomes better informed and better educated: the aspiration to equality and the aspiration to participation, two forms of man's dignity and freedom." 65 Paul's insistence on equality and participation recalls new emphases on democracy in the magisterial tradition from the time of Pius XII onward, and the gradual rejection of the hierarchical ordering of human persons favored by Leo XIII and Pius XL In response to the ravages of the Second World War, Pius had recognized the need for citizens to participate in their destinies. 66 John XXIII had identified in Pacem in terris the "right to take an active part in public affairs and to contribute one's part to the common good." 67 This accentuation of participation is accompanied by respect for the increasing importance of the political sphere. In modern life, therefore, persons must participate in the political life of their countries and thus contribute to the common good.
Third, in his Apostolic Exhortation on the Family John Paul avers "that the well-being of society and her own good are intimately tied to the good of the family"; when one supports the family, one is "contributing to the renewal of society and of the people of God." 68 Just as the private and public realms are consistent with one another, so the major encyclicals on the family (e.g., Arcanum, Casti connubii, Humanae vitae) describe it as the fundamental unit of society. It contributes to the wellbeing of society, and the state must defend and protect it. Once again, the tradition upholds not discord or disharmony of aims, but institutions working together for individual and common good.
Fourth, in his second encyclical, Dives in misericordia, John Paul praises mercy and its effect on social justice. He argues:
In reciprocal relationships between persons merciful love is never a unilateral act or process. Even in the cases in which everything would seem to indicate that only one party is giving and offering, and the other only receiving and taking (for example, in the case of a physician giving treatment, a teacher teaching, parents supporting and bringing up their children, a benefactor helping the needy), in reality the one who gives is always also a beneficiary. In any case, he too can easily find himself in the position of the one who receives, who obtains a benefit, who experiences merciful love; he too can find himself the object of mercy. The history of mainstream theological, philosophical, psychological, and other accounts of women's nature is by now well known and has been traced by competent scholars in a number of disciplines. Philosophers, theologians, and psychologists have reminded us, e.g., that the human capacity for morality has often been perceived as linked to rationality, and that women human beings have frequently been characterized as less rational, and thus less moral, than men. So we have been told, e.g., that Aristotle argued that "the deliberative faculty in the soul is not present at all in a slave; in a female it is inoperative, in a child undeveloped"; that his interpreter in the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas, identified women as "defective" and "misbegotten" (although not misbegotten for the "work of generation"); that Sigmund Freud argued that women show "less sense of justice" because "they are more influenced in their judgments by their feelings of affection or hostility." 73 One could proceed at length with such quotations. But what we have learned from these studies is that suspicion about women (about their lack of rationality, and therefore their questionable judgment, especially about justice) joined to appreciation of certain qualities of women (usually their capacity to reproduce) has in the past kept women segregated in the private sphere, separated from public roles and from political leadership.
Often women's role in public and political life has been limited by arguments that women are not inferior but rather morally superior to men. For example, historians remind us that in the years following the Industrial Revolution much of women's work was removed from the public workplace and was relocated in the private home. It was on the basis of an emergent "cult of domesticity" or "cult of true womanhood" that women were identified as the guardians of the home, and the home became a "sanctuary," a safe place, constructed by women, in which men could escape from the horrors of the working world. Once again the separation of public and private spheres was enforced, and women were identified with the private, men with the public.
But, as Rosemary Radford Ruether has noted, this form of link between women and the private realm is sustained by the belief that women are "'too pure,' too noble, to descend into the base world of work and politics." 74 The quotation from Ruether continues: "To step out of her moral shrine to work or to vote, to attend universities with men, and mingle with them in the forums of powei is to sully her virtue and destroy instantly that respect which accrues to her in the 'sanctuary' suffrage (which he opposes). He asks:
Why should a woman lower herself to sordid politics? Why should a woman leave her home and go into the street to play the game of politics? ... Why should she long to rub elbows with men who are her inferiors intellectually and morally? Why should a woman long to go into the streets and leave behind her happy home, her children, a husband and everything that goes to make up an ideal domestic life?
When a woman enters the political arena, she goes outside the sphere for which she was intended. She gains nothing by that journey. On the other hand, she loses the exclusiveness, respect and dignity to which she is entitled in her home Woman is queen, but her kingdom is the domestic kingdom.
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In her account of the struggles of 18th-and 19th-century feminists, Carolyn Korsmeyer insists that one of the barriers they had to overcome was the popular idea that women and men inhabit different spheres of morality and therefore practice different virtues. She states:
Considered too weak physically to venture into the world outside the home and too deficient in reason to make important decisions, the woman was relegated to the domestic sphere where, under the guidance and direction of her rationally superior husband, she tended house, raised children, and gave her family comfort and pleasure. Correspondingly, her "virtues" were the outgrowth of her sensitive, yielding nature: kindness, humility, gentleness, protectiveness, and so on.
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Such weaknesses could be easily co-opted, and such virtues could be easily corrupted in the public arena.
In the past, then, arguments about women's nature (whether that nature is assessed as inferior or superior to men's) have served to exclude women from the public realm and to connect them in special ways to the private. Because so many assessments of their nature have emphasized women's reproductive capacities, women have been especially identified with the family. Common to these proposals, however, is reflection on women's experience. Farley asserts that a feminist ethic "includes a focal concern for the well-being of women and a taking account of women's experience as a way to understand what well-being means for women and men." 82 An example of such use of women's experience is the feminist theological discussion of agape. That analysis has been influenced by the 1960 article of Valerie Saiving, "The Human Situation: A Feminine View." 83 Saiving argued that women's experience is different from that of men; the basic sin of men might be pride, but that of women is self-abnegation or sloth. Naming pride as the primary violation of agape could harm women, since women need to learn a proper self-assertion and a proper self-love. Saiving worried that if women take seriously injunctions against the sin of pride, they will "strangle" the impulses toward self necessary for their development.
In response to Saiving, as well as to Outka's analysis of agape, some feminists have argued that self-sacrifice cannot serve as the standard of Christian love for women. For women have been harmed by self-sacrifice, have been kept from full development and full participation by their adherence to self-sacrifice as a moral standard. What many contemporary feminists endorse instead is a standard of agape as mutuality, a type of relationship in which both parties love and are loved, which allows one to be concerned or loving toward the self while also caring for others, or, as Beverly Wildung Harrison describes it, "love that has both the quality of a gift received and the quality of a gift given."
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Feminists insist that the norm of mutuality has important implications for women's roles in church, society, and family. For Farley, it leads to "new patterns of relationship" between men and women. We have seen that Farley argues that the family has been the realm of self-sacrificial love for women but not for men. Attention to the experience of women, and to mutuality, requires a change in moral standards for the family. "The true importance of the family will be seen when it has neither subordinate importance for men nor predominant importance for women, but when it takes its place along with other key human enterprises, the task of men and women, the concern of the whole church. of their sex is dead." 87 She concludes that women will not be included in Western political thought without a reconstruction of the family and its relationship to politics.
Okin acknowledges that such re-examination of the family will call into question the foundations of liberal political thought. For while that theory is apparently based on claims about humans as individuals, she argues that it in fact presupposes the family and certain roles for women within the family. Thus an investigation of the public-private question in liberal political theory becomes essential. 93 With the separation of spheres and the location of reproduction in the private realm, the roles of women and men in society are distorted. Wolff argues that "to demand that the public world of work and politics be blind to age, sex, race, and so forth precisely is to equate the most essential facts of my human self with relatively trivial facts of my tastes and preferences, and to consign them all to the private world where they will have no influence on important public policies and decisions.
Liberal Political Theory and the Public-Private
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Wolff portrays his own experience-as professor and parent and spouse, in relationship to a woman who is also professor, parent, and spouse-to highlight the difficulties of the public-private arrangement and to show that persons are both private and public individuals. He then offers four possible resolutions of the problem. First, one could accept the public-private split and change the criteria of admission into each sphere. Second, one could accept the dichotomy and carry it to its logical conclusions. Third, society could make ad hoc adjustments which would soften the impact of the public-private separation, or fourth, it could struggle against it. At the same time But I must confess that I don't know what those words mean. I cannot now form a concrete conception of a set of social arrangements which would, at one and the same time, respect the nature of each person as a rational moral agent, and also sustain and support each man and woman in a natural human way along the life cycle from birth, through childhood, young adulthood, maturity, old age, to death.
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Contemporary liberal thought about the public and the private exemplifies the difficulties in relating the public and private to women and men in a coherent and fair manner. It illustrates the same difficulty highlighted by feminist theory-the conceptual confusion surrounding private and public once certain assumptions about men's nature and women's nature are questioned. One way to characterize these developments is to state that they suggest that one is left with a fundamental ethical question: whether or not there is a social theory capable of treating both women and men as both private and public persons.
CONCLUSIONS: WRC AND PRIVATE-PUBLIC LIFE
We are by now a long way from Agnes Mary Mansour, Arlene Violet, and Elizabeth Morancy and the prohibitions against their participation in partisan political activity. But unless their situation is examined in light of the public-private distinction, the significance of their exclusion from political life cannot be understood.
An initial public-private argument about WRC is, of course, a strictly ecclesiological one. That is, one could compare women's public role in the Church with that of men. The denial to women of the public roles of the priest-with his public symbolization of the Church and Jesus Christ-perpetuates the dichotomy of women as private and men as public persons. For even if the priest is excluded from public political office, he still has available a public ecclesiastical function. WRC are denied both.
But I have argued that such ecclesiological arguments are insufficient for our consideration. For service in public office raises ethical as well as theological questions, problems political as well as ecclesiological. Public service by women provokes substantive and procedural questions about the nature of women and women's experience. For that reason I have argued that the role of WRC in politics must be examined in light of magisterial statements about women and about the public and private, as well as contemporary insights into the public and private.
When one examines these issues in conjunction with one another, it becomes noticeable that the exclusion of WRC from political office recalls Ibid. 143-44. earlier suspicions in the Roman Catholic magisterial tradition about women's participation in the public arena. It focuses attention as well on the past and present statements about women's special relationship to the family. For we have seen that even though the magisterium no longer prohibits or questions the participation of women in politics, it continues to favor a special role for women in the family, due to their maternal natures. Such linkages of women to the family run the risk of establishing dichotomies between the public and private roles of women and men, with women still "more private," "less public" than men. The exclusion of WRC from politics re-enforces such dichotomies.
An additional difficulty is that the Roman Catholic magisterial tradition affirms the consistency of the public and private spheres of human life, accentuates participation in political life, refuses to view the family as a strictly private institution, and asserts a norm of mutuality for interpersonal as well as social ethics. In this ethic the Roman Catholic magisterial tradition is responsive in many ways to the concerns of contemporary feminist and liberal theorists. Thus Roman Catholic social thought appears poised to offer a constructive response to those opposed to the disintegration of public and private life, or to a privatization of morality or of human persons. It finds itself in agreement with those who call for a new respect for the private sphere, for work in the home and in the family. From this perspective its division of women's life from men's life, in the family, in society, and in the Church, and its neglect of women's participation in assessments of human nature, are problematic according to its own criteria. With such standards one must call into question accounts of human nature which carry overtones of a separation between public and private. For a dichotomy of persons' roles in public and private may in fact promote a division between public and private realms of human life. So, too, could different roles in family (eros for men? agape for women?) and in society for women and for men undermine mutuality as the norm for human relationships.
The question of WRC in politics, then, with all of the assumptions that stand behind it, forces a re-examination of Roman Catholic social ethics. For it is not yet clear if the Roman Catholic magisterial traditionwith its affirmation of public-private consistency, participation, wellbeing of the family, and mutuality-offers an ethic that affirms both women and men as both public and private persons. For the application of those norms may be unduly restricted if it is exclusive of certain groups of persons, or if it is based on perceptions of human persons challenged by those who are perceived.
